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Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
In Johnson v. Louisiana' and Apodaca v. Oregon
2
the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the Loui-
siana and Oregon Constitutions permitting jury
verdicts by 9-3 and 10-2 votes. The Court held
that unanimous verdicts were not necessitated
either by the requirement of proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt or as part of the sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury.
Despite consideration of a number of cases re-
lated to jury issues,' the Court had never previously
'406 U.S. 356 (1972).
'406 U.S. 404 (1972).
3 Relevant cases can be divided into three groups.
One group dealt with nonunanimous verdicts in the
federal system. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher,
166 U.S. 464 (1897), held that Congress could not
permit the then territory of Utah to decide civil cases
by a 9 of 12 verdict, since the seventh amendment re-
quired jury trial and unanimity was an essential ele-
ment of jury trial as it existed at common law. It ex-
pressly avoided the question of the power of a state
to dispense with unanimity. In 1948 Andres v. United
States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948), applied American Publish-
ing in a criminal trial in territorial Hawaii. Thompson
v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), decided a year after
American Publishing, stated that the federal Constitu-
tion required unanimous verdicts by a jury of 12.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), held
that the sixth amendment required unanimous verdicts
in federal criminal cases, but that unanimity could be
waived. A Sixth Circuit decision, Hibdon v. United
States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953), overturned an
irregular waiver of a unanimous verdict by a federal
defendant, stating that unanimity was required by
the reasonable doubt standard. But the First Circuit,
in Fournier v. Gonzales, 269 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 93 (1959), rejected Hibdon, as-
suming that the Territory of Puerto Rico had the
powers of a state.
A second group of cases contained dictum indicat-
ing that the states were not required to provide un-
animous verdicts. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605
(1900), held that a jury of 12, required in federal
cases, was not required in state prosecutions, and
stated that neither unanimous jury verdicts nor jury
trial itself was required. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968), rejected the Maxwell language on
the right to trial by jury. However, Williams v. Flor-
ida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), held that the Constitution did
not require the states to provide a 12 man jury.
The third group of cases involves the exclusion of
minority groups from jury service. In 1879, Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), established
that tjhe equal protection clause prohibits exclusion of
minority members. However, the absence of such
members from the jury does not in itself violate equal
protection. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205
(1965). Since states are free to make valid discrimina-
tions in selecting jurors, there has been much litigation
over the years on whether particular systems of jury
selection are valid, with the challenger bearing the
decided whether the states were required to provide
unanimous jury verdicts. The issue arose inci.
dentally in 1968 in Dman v. Louisiana,4 where
the Court held that the sixth and fourteenth
amendments required Louisiana to provide trial
by jury in a case punishable by two years or more
imprisonment. justice White, writing for the court,
stated that the decision would require no wide-
spread change in state criminal processes, because
only two states, Louisiana and Oregon, permitted
less than unanimous verdicts in cases punishable
by more than one year imprisonment. 5 In 1970
the Court held, in Williams v. Florida,6 that the
sixth amendment permitted a state to employ
juries of six rather than twelve persons. However
a footnote suggested that unanimity might be
important to ensure that the prosecution bore a
heavier burden of proof. Justice Harlan, dissent-
ing in Williams, stated that less than unanimous
verdicts were unthinkable.8  These comments
seemed to indicate that the Court was likely to
require that the states provide unanimous ver-
dicts. However, by the time the issue arose for
decision in 1972,9 Justices Harlan and Black had
been replaced by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
and both new justices sided with the 5-4 majority
which reversed the previous trend.
The Louisiana Constitution provides that in
cases where punishment may be at hard labor,
a unanimous verdict by a jury of 5 is required,
but where punishment is necessarily at hard labor,
concurrence by 9 out of 12 jurors is required."0
burden of proof. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Commission,
396 U.S. 320 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954);
Cassel v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
4 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
5 Id. at 158 n.30. Several states permit less than
unanimous verdicts in misdemeanor cases: InAHo
CONST. art. 1, §7 (V); MoNT. CoNsT. art III, §23
(h); OKLA. CoNsT. art. II, §19 (9/); TEx. CONsT. art
V, §13 (9 of 12).
8399 U.S. 78 (1970).7 Id. at 100 n.46.
8 Id. at 122 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9 A 1968 attempt to raise the issue failed when the
Court refused to apply Duncan retroactively. DeSte-
fano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
ILA. CONST. art. 7 §41. See also LA. CanL PRo.
COnE ANN. art. 782 (West 1966). A provision requir-
ing a unanimous verdict of 12 jurors in capital cases
has been rendered obsolete, for the moment at least,
by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which held
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Frank Johnson was convicted of armed robbery
by a 9-3 verdict in a trial held prior to the decision
of Duncan v. Louisiana. Since the Court had pre-
viously held that it would not apply Duncan retro-
actively,1' Johnson could not argue that unanimous
verdicts were a part of the sixth amendment's
requirement of trial by jury which Duncan had
applied to the states. Instead he claimed it was
mandated by the requirement of proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, which is applied to
the states by the due process clause.P He argued
that majority jurors should necessarily have some
reasonable doubt if their fellow jurors were not
convinced, and that dissent is itself proof that
reasonable doubt exists. The Court rejected this
argument and held, in an opinion by Justice White,
that unanimous verdicts are not required by due
process.18 It felt that a majority would try to per-
suade the minority until the minority "continues
to insist upon acquittal without having persuasive
reasons in support of its position." 41 The Court
felt experience indicated that jurors would not
ignore the reasonable doubts of their colleagues.
It found that disagreement within a jury does not
prove the existence of reasonable doubt because
convictions are upheld where reasonable doubt
would have been justified or where trial or ap-
pellate judges would have disagreed with the jury,
and because in the federal system a hung jury does
not result in acquittal but subjects the defendant
to possible retrial."1
Johnson also argued that the Louisiana provi-
sions providing for unanimous verdicts in some
but not all cases was an invidious discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause.'6 The
Court disagreed, finding that the standard of
proof did not change, but only the number of
jurors to be convinced. Moreover, it found the
state had a rational purpose--to "facilitate, ex-
pedite and reduce expense in the administration
of justice" 17-while at the same time it provided
more jurors in more serious cases.
the death penalty unconstitutional. A provision re-
quiring trial without a jury in cases providing im-
prisonment not at hard labor was overturned in Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).1 DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
12 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV. See In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970).13 406 U.S. at 363. See also Jordan v. Massachusetts,
225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
1" 406 U.S. at 361.
isId. at 1624-25.
1" U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
IT 406 U.S. at 364, citing State v. Lewis, 129 La. 800,
804, 56 So. 893, 894 (1911).
Justice Stewart dissented in Johnson on the
ground that a unanimous verdict was required
by due process in order to ensure public confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system and
to minimize the danger of jury misconduct and
bigotry. He felt that the decision undermined a
line of cases prohibiting discrimination in the
jury selection process. 8
Apodaca v. Oregon" arose under the Oregon
Constitution which provides that all verdicts other
than guilty of first degree murder must have the
concurrence of 10 out of 12 jurors.2* For a verdict
of guilty of first degree murder a unanimous verdict
is required. Three defendants, including Robert
Apodaca, were convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon, burglary of a dwelling and grand larceny,
two defendants by 11-1 votes and one by a 10-2
vote. They argued that unanimous verdicts were
part of the sixth amendment right to jury trial
required of the states by due process under Duncan.
The Court disagreed by a 5-4 vote but without a
majority opinion or rationale. Justice White, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist, found that the sixth amendment
right to jury tri4 did not require unanimous ver-
dicts. Relying on historical material similar to
that considered in Williams v. Florida," he con-
cluded that the requirement of unanimity, like
the jury of 12, was a historical accident. He cited
the deletion of a unanimity provision from the
House version of the sixth amendment to show
that the framers' intent was not to require una-
nimity. He reiterated that the purpose of the jury
system was to protect against prosecutorial and
judicial misconduct and to infuse the common sense
of laymen into the criminal process. = He found
that this did not require unanimous verdicts, but
only required that juries be selected from a cross
section of the community and be free from in-
timidation. He found that the reasonable doubt
standard developed at a different time than the
jury system and was unrelated to the sixth amend-
ment. To counter the assertion that the decision
undermined provisions prohibiting discrimination
in jury selection, White stated that minority group
jurors have no right to veto the conviction of a
fellow member since there is no requirement that
minority group members be on the jury at all. 3
18 See cases cited in note 3 supra.
"1406 U.S. at 404 (1972).
2ORE. CoqsT. art. I, §11.21399 U.S. 78 (1970).
406 U.S. at 410 (White, J., concurring).




He also presumed that minority jurors' views
would be rationally considered by the rest of the
jury. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion,
adding that he felt that a less substantial majority
than 9-3 would pose a closer question, and that
he would, were he a legislator, oppose the con-
tested provisions.
Justice Powell concurred in the result but dis-
agreed with the reasoning. He read history and
precedent as preserving in the sixth amendment,
and thereby imposing on the federal system, the
jury trial as it existed at common law, including
the requirement of unanimous verdicts.2 4 However,
he felt that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment did not impose federal sixth amend-
ment standards on the states. Although he ac-
cepted Duncan's holding that due process required
the states to provide jury trial in serious cases,21
he felt states should be free to experiment with the
jury system. He agreed with Justice White's
analysis of the fundamental purposes of the jury
sybLcm and their satisfaction by the Oregon prac-
tice. He also found support for less than unanimous
verdicts in England, where unanimity was recently
abandoned,3 and in proposals by the American
Law Instituten and American Bar Association.
29
Justice Stewart dissented from the White opin-
ion's holding that unanimous verdicts are not part
of the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by
jury. 0 Justice Douglas dissented in both cases,
finding a radical departure from tradition and from
2A406 U.S. at 370 & n.6, 371 nn.7&8 (Powell, J.,
concurring). See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 280 (1930).
25 406 U.S. at 372 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring). Dun-
can rejected several cases, particularly Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900), relied on by Justice
Powell for his conclusion that the states may deny
unanimous verdicts. These cases said in dictum that
states may deny jury trial altogether, since due pro-
cess required only that which was necessary to ordered
liberty. Justice Powell accepts Duncan, finding that
the modem view of due process requires that which is
fundamental in the context of the Anglo-Americanjurisprudential system common to the states. He
finds trial by jury, but not unanimous verdicts, funda-
mental.
26 406 U.S. at 376-77 (Powell, J., concurring).
27See Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury: Notes
on an English Controversy, 48 Cm. BAR RECORD 195(1967).
28 ALI, ConE o" CRmMNAL PROCEDURE §335 (1931).
29 ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRnmAL JUSTCE, STAunARs RELATING TO TRIAL
BY JURY §1.1 & commentary pp. 25-28 (Approved
Draft 1968).
3 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See And-
res v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
cases applying the Bill of Rights to the states. 1
He also noted evidence from the Kalven and Zeisel
jury studies 2 indicating that nonunanimous ver-
dicts would provide more acquittals than convic-
tions and would lead to hasty verdicts decided
without proper deliberation. Justice Brennan
echoed Justices Stewart and Douglas. justice
Marshall's dissent disputed three other bases of
the White opinion. It argued that guilt is not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt if all jurors
are not convinced, that the fact that the Constitu-
tion permits retrial after a hung jury does not
imply that it permits conviction by less than unan-
imous verdict, and that if a jury is properly selected
and composed of rational persons, then the irra-
tionality objected to by Justice White is in fact
part of the essence of the jury system.
The basic issues presented in the cases are
whether unanimous verdicts are inherently part
of the trial by jury which is required of the states,
and whether nonunanimous verdicts are consistent
with proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is re-
quired of the states, 3 but the Johnson majority
held that this does not require that jury verdicts
be unanimous, since the reasonable doubt standard
lies in the mind of each individual juror and not
in the way the votes are counted. This double as-
pect of the reasonable doubt standard has long
been recognized but, as Justice Marshall notes,
it strains the language to say someone has been
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when
three jurors disagree. The Johnson opinion's answer
seems to be a suggestion that the minority jurors
are being unreasonable because they cannot per-
suade the majority jurors. 5 It cites language from
the "Allen charge" 16 telling minority jurors on a
deadlocked jury to consider whether their views
are tenable in view of their inability to persuade
others who are equally intelligent. However, sug-
gesting that a juror consider whether he is being
31406 U.S. at 381-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting). oct
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
3" H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, Tim AMEmRCAN JURY
460, (1966) [hereinafter cited as KALvEN & ZEISEL]
cited by Douglas, J., dissenting, 406 U.S. at 391 & n.5.
'3In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
3' See Comment, Waiver of Jury Unanimity-Some
Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21 U. Cm. L. Rxv.
438, 441 (1954).35 406 U.S at 361-62.
36 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492,501 (1896).
For criticism of the Allen charge, see KALvEN &
ZEISEL, supra note 32, at 454 n.3.
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unreasonable is different from establishing as a
matter of law that he is. Furthermore, the fact
that jury verdicts are sustained where trial or
appellate judges or hypothetical reasonable men
might disagree has little bearing on what should
happen when the jurors, the established triers of
fact, do disagree. In addition, the opinion con-
strues the fact that a federal defendant who re-
ceives a hung jury can be retried and convicted
by a unanimous verdict to indicate that conviction
is possible even though some jurors are never con-
vinced of guilt. However, conviction on retrial
after a hung jury bears more resemblance to a
verdict reached after several votes than to a less
than unanimous verdict, since at least some jury
must be unanimously convinced of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt before the defendant can be
convicted. The Johnson Court's arguments on the
reasonable doubt issue are unpersuasive.
Apodaca turned on the question of whether
unanimous verdicts were inherent in trial by jury
required of the states by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. Determination of what constitutes
trial by jury is difficult because the jury is a legal
institution which has developed over centuries
in England and the United States. Unless one
accepts, as Justice Powell does, that the Constitu-
tion adopts all aspects of the jury system as it
existed in 1787, it is necessary to make a "func-
tional analysis" of the jury in order to determine
the fundamental purposes it serves. This analysis
must consider the reasons for the original develop-
ment of the jury, the reasons for its retention in
the legal system if the old reasons became invalid,
and the reasons for its retention today.
In his Apodaca opinion Justice White adopted
the results of the searching historical and func-
tional analysis given the jury system in Duncan v.
Louisiana and Williams v. Florida.u In those
cases, determining whether states were required
to provide trial by jury in serious cases and whether
the jury had to be composed of twelve persons,
the Court found that the essential purpose of the
jury was "to safeguard against the -corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased or eccentric judge," 11 and "the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the com-
monsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in
the community participation and shared responsi-
391 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968).
28399 U.S. 78, 87 nn.19&20, 92-100, 9& n.45 (1970).
31 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
bility that results." 40 After accepting that view
of the jury's purpose, Justice White suggested
four historical reasons for the development of the
unanimous verdict rule: 1) the absence of other
rules ensuring a fair trial; 2) the medieval practice
of trial by compurgation where twelve witness-
jurors were required to convict; 3) the possibility
of perjury charges against a dissenting witness-
juror; and 4) the medieval concept of consent which
required unanimity to bind a community.4 Such
reasons, relevant in the late fourteenth century,
have little significance today and do not explain
why the tradition of unanimous verdicts persisted
through 1787 to the present.
The dissenting opinions argue with much force
that the reasons for the persistence of the unani-
mous verdict are the same as the reasons for the
reasonable doubt standard-to maintain commun-
ity confidence in the criminal justice system and
to avoid the serious harm resulting from wrongful
conviction.42 The Court considers evaluation of
community confidence a job for legislators,43 but
it is difficult to avoid the constitutional implica-
tions of the prevalence of unanimous verdicts at
the time the Constitution was adopted." More-
over, stating that the jury exists only to protect
against prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, to
infuse commonsense into factfinding and to spread
responsibility for the decision of whether to use
criminal sanctions, although adequate for the
issues presented in Duncan and Williams, over-
looks other policies relevant to unanimous ver-
dicts. The jury is a democratizing force in the law
which at times functions properly by ignoring
legislative and judicial commands. 45 The unani-
mous verdict acts as a check on the jury's power
and ensures that its decisions reflect the most
broadly shared values. The dissenters, particularly
Justice Marsha'l, grasp this aspect ot the jury
which the other Justices ignore.
Justice White's functional analysis leads him
40 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
41406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (White, J., concurring in
Johnson).
42406 U.S. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at
392 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41406 U.S. at 364-65; id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring).
44 See 406 U.S. at 408 & n.3 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Williams, noted the
final wording of the sixth amendment as likely repre-
sents a streamlining of language as a statement of
constitutional indifference to the unanimous verdict.
399 U.S. at 123 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46 See P. DEvLiN, TRiAL By Jumy 164 (1956).
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to the conclusion that no essential purpose of the
jury requires unanimity.46 Except for a footnote
comment that unanimity proved unworkable in
fifteenth century Parliament,0 he offers no reasons
against unanimity.48 Presumably he considers eval-
uation of such issues to be a legislative function.49
Justice Powell presents some reasonb against una-
nimity,50 including the ease of bribing a single
juror"1 and the possibility of a hanging juror who
through wilfulness and stubboress closes his
eyes to the law and the evidence. He also notes
that the unanimity rule does not always produce
true unanimity but rather often causes compromise
verdicts, sometimes contrary to the facts in evi-
dence, which will lessen any deterrent effect of
conviction and further erode the confidence of
participants and the public in the criminal process.
Other reasons alluded to in the opinions include
the cost of retrial in money and court time,u the
fact that important public decisions are made
by judges, legislators and voters by less than unan-
imous votes,u and the likelihood that less than
unanimous verdicts will increase the number of
convictions." Although the Court does not ex-
46justice Powell would agree that no essential
purpose of the jury requires the states to provide un-
animity, although he sees the federal system as being
bound by history.
47 406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (White, J., concurring).
48 See generally Comment, Should Jury Verdicts Be
Unanimous in Criminal Casest, 47 ORE. L. REv. 417
(1968).49 The Louisiana procedure, said to be designed
"to facilitate, expedite and reduce expense in the
administration of criminal justice," 406 U.S. at 364
appears to be rooted in that state's civil law tradition.
See, Comment, Jury Trial in Louisiana-Implications
of Duncan, 29 LA. L. RZv. 118, 120 (1968). The Ore-
gon practice was adopted by constitutional amend-
ment in 1934 during a period of nationwide contro-
versy concerning the jury system. See Comment,
supra note 48, at 418.50 406 U.S. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring).
51 This has been cited as the reason for the abandon-
ment of the unanimity rule in England. Kalven &
Zeisel, supra note 27.
62 406 U.S. at 364.
6 Id. at 362-63. Id. at 407 n.2 (White, J., concurring
in Apodoca).
R This issue was severely disputed. Justice Douglas
cited the Kalven & Zeisel jury studies, indicating that
twice as many nonunanimous verdicts will result in
convictions as acquittals. KALVEN & ZEISEL at 460,
Table 125, quoted by Douglas, J., dissenting at 406
U.S. 391 n.5. This is the same ratio as that of convic-
tions to acquittals generally. KALVEN & ZEISEL at
461. Thus when Kalven and Zeisel say "the probabil-
ity that an acquittal minority will hang the jury is
about as great as that a guilty minority will hang it,"
id., they mean that acquittal minority jurors are no
more stubborn than conviction minority jurors, not
that an equal number of hung juries (and therefore
nonunanimous verdicts) will be for acquittal as for
pressly evaluate the merits of these reasons against
unanimity, a majority of justices consider them
strong enough to permit the states to rely on them
despite the prevalence, historically and today, of
less than unanimous verdicts.
Appellants also argued that less than unanimous
verdicts would deprive minority group jurors of
the ability to cause a hung jury and prevent'con-
viction, and would thereby render meaningless
decisions which prohibit discrimination in jury
selection. 55 Justice White in Apodaca, after noting
that minority group members do not have the
right to have fellow members on their particular
juries,516 stated that if such members are on the
jury they have the right to try to persuade the rest
of the jurors of their position. He presumes that
the majority will act rationally and in good faith
toward the minority group members. This appears
to be an overly optimistic view of the history of
minority group relations in the United States."
Nevertheless a majority of the Justices feel that
protection of minority groups is not an essential
function of the jury and does not justify a unani-
mous verdict requirement.
Johnson and Apodaca leave several questions
open. Five Justices are of the opinion that unani-
mous verdicts are required in federal criminal
trials, even though five Justices found them not
required in state trials. Only Justice Powell finds
this theoretically consistent, and it is not clear
that unanimity would be required in federal trials,.
were the issue to arise in the future.- A question
is also raised as to how small a majority is per-
missible. The functional analysis in Justice White's
Apodaca opinion does not appear to require more
than a simple majority, although Justice Blackmun
expresses misgivings.-' However, the Johnson ma-
jority found the rea.sonahh' doubt standard satis-
fied because a "substantial" and "heavy" majority
conviction. But the latter meaning is what Justice
White appears to have in mind when he uses the quo-
tation in his Apodaca opinion. 406 U.S. at 411 n.5.
15 See cases cited in note 3 supra.
51 Swain v Abamna, 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965).
57 For abuses against minority groups perpetrated
through the criminal justice system, see Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250 n.15 251 (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) in-
dicating that blacks have received a disproportionate-
share of death sentences in rape cases.
1 Federal unanimous verdicts are required under
FEn. R. Cnms. P. 31(a). In the 38 years that Oregon
and Louisiana have had nonunanimous verdict pro-
visions, other states and the federal system have not
been persuaded to follow, although these cases may
persuade them to do so.
1 406 U.S. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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